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Abstract
In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of linguistic ersatzism,
the ontologically deationary view that possible worlds are maxi-
mal and consistent sets of sentences, and possible world semantics,
the view that the meaning of a sentence is the set of possible worlds
at which it is true, implies that no actual speaker can effectively
use virtually any language to successfully communicate informa-
tion. This result is based on complexity issues that relate to our
nite computational ability to deal with large bodies of information
and a strong, but well motivated, assumption about the cognitive ac-
cessibility of meanings of sentences ersatzers seem to be implicitly
committed to. It follows that linguistic ersatzism, possible world
semantics, or both must be rejected.
Introduction
Possible world semantics holds that the meanings of all well-formed declar-
ative sentences in a language Li are to be equated with the set of all possible
worlds at which that sentence P is true.1 Where Pwwf are the well-formed
declarative sentences of language Li, P ∈ Pwwf, W is the set of worlds
{w1, w2, . . . , wn} at which P is true, and W is the set of all possible worlds
such that for each wi, wi ∈ W:
(Def. 1) The meaning, |P |, of any P in a given Li = W .
†The authors would like to thank Hal Brown and two anonymous referees for insightful
comments.
1 See Lewis [1] and Cresswell [2].
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62 MICHAEL J. SHAFFER AND JEREMY MORRIS
There are, of course, a variety of views concerning the nature of possible
worlds, and, hence, a variety of views concerning how we ought to interpret
Def. 1. One attractive and ontologically conservative view is linguistic er-
satzism, and this view has been championed by the likes of such notables
as C.I. Lewis [3], Carnap [4], Hintikka [5] and Montague [6]. There are,
however, serious problems with this particular view of possible worlds, es-
pecially as it is applied in the analysis of the semantics of actual languages
as employed by real linguistic agents. These worries arise in the context of
some objectionable computational aspects of possible world semantics and
linguistic ersatzism that threaten our ability to cognitively grasp the mean-
ings of sentences. As a result this conjunction of views implies our inability
to communicate information and so cannot be an adequate semantics for real
languages.
1. Linguistic Ersatzism
Before we can analyze the acceptability of this view, we must consider how
the ersatzer conceives of possible worlds. Essentially, on this view a possi-
ble world is to be reductively identied with a maximal and consistent set of
sentences. So we can dene ersatzer possible worlds as follows. Where each
Sl is a maximal and consistent set of sentences in some language and wj ∈W,
(Def. 2) (∀wi)(∃Sl)wi = Sl.
Thus, for ersatz semantics the meaning of a sentence P is exhaustively given
by linguistically specifying the various ways the total world could have been
such that the sentence in question is true, and this is just to specify the set
of maximally complete and consistent state-descriptions at which P is true.2
We will refer to the set of Sl that constitute W for a given P , as S, or the
‘S-set’ of P . The S-set of a given P , is the semantic, or information, content
2 One might argue that the ersatzer need not identify meanings with possible worlds un-
derstood as sets of sentences and suggest that the ersatzer should simply regard these con-
structions as useful fictions or models of actual meanings. However, this tactic is not really
open to the ersatzer. First, either the ersatzer who accepts possible world semantics identifies
meanings with possible worlds, or that view is simply not a version of possible world seman-
tics. Second, without the identification of meanings with possible worlds the metaphysical
motivation of ersatzism, to reject realism about possible worlds by reducing them to sets of
sentences, is lost. Finally, if such a theorist holds that the sets of sentences that characterize
possible worlds are merely useful fictions or models and not to be identified with meanings
then the ersatzer not only loses any reason to reject realism about possible worlds but is in
danger of being thereby committed to a rejection of realism about meaning (for more on this
last problem see section 5.2).
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of P in the Wittgensteinian and Popperian sense that the S-set species for
P the range that it leaves open to the facts (41) [7].3
2. Ersatzism and Our Grasp of Meanings
Owing to its ontological austerity, ersatzism concerning possible worlds is
one of the most well entrenched views concerning the nature of possible
worlds. Nevertheless, this appealing conjunction of linguistic ersatzism and
possible world semantics entails that no actual human being is physically
capable of producing or comprehending meaningful sentences of most ordi-
nary and many formal languages (i.e. no such being could possess adequate
semantic competence). But of course this is absurd, and so either ersatzism
or possible world semantics or both must be rejected. Deriving this conclu-
sion that contradicts the empirical facts of human language use from the con-
junction of these two compelling doctrines will require only that we accept a
rather mild and well-veried claim concerning the reasoning/computational
abilities of nite agents like ourselves, and an intuitively plausible claim
concerning the relationship between the meaningful use of language and the
cognitive accessibility of such meanings that ersatzers seem to be implicitly
committed to.
3. The Epistemic Assumption
The rst condition to be imposed on a theory of meaning is the epistemic
assumption. It simply states that to meaningfully use, or to effectively com-
municate by using, a sentence requires that the user have knowledge that the
sentence means what it does.4 In other words, one must ‘grasp’ the meaning
3 Compare Popper [8], 119–120.
4 One might be tempted to claim that such beliefs need only be de re beliefs and not de
dicto beliefs, but, following Pollock [9], 60–81, de re beliefs are either derived from prior de
dicto beliefs or acquired directly by perception. Neither of these options would work here
for the ersatzer for obvious reasons. Moreover, Salmon [10] gives us some reason to believe
that de re beliefs are reducible to de dicto beliefs. Alternatively, one might be tempted to
argue that effective communication requires only that one know how to use a given sentence.
But, we there are good reasons to believe that knowing how to use a sentence for effective
communication requires knowing what it means. We are in good company here in making
this assumption as this sort of cognitivist view is shared in various forms by Dummet [25],
Davies [26], Heck [27], Higgenbottom [28] and Larsen and Segal [29], among others.
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64 MICHAEL J. SHAFFER AND JEREMY MORRIS
of an expression to use it correctly.5 In accord with the basic principles of
epistemic logic this will be interpreted as requiring of A that BA,T (P means
S) & JA,T BA,T (P means S) & (P means S), where BA,T P represents A’s
belief that P in situation T and JA,T BA,T P represents A’s being justied in
his believing that P in situation T . This principle guarantees the satisfaction
of the intuitively plausible requirement that S-sets must be the object of a
positive doxastic attitude on the part of A.
From this principle it follows that if BA,T (P means S) & JA,T BA,T (P
means S), then S must be cognitively accessible to A in some minimal re-
spect. This derived requirement will be referred to as the doxastic assump-
tion. Moreover, if A’s successful use of a sentence requires that she believe
that P means S by the epistemic assumption, then it seems that A must min-
imally be able to conceive that S if A is to successfully use that sentence.
This further derived basic requirement will be referred to as the conceivabil-
ity assumption.
3.1. The Epistemic Assumption Formalized
The EA may be controversial, but, nevertheless, it appears to be an important
component of the sort of semantical theories to be discussed here. It can be
given a more precise formulation as follows:
(EA) For any agent A, A’s use of P of Li in situation T for purposes
of effective communication → KA,T (P means S).6
In EA KA,T (P means S) symbolizes A’s knowledge that P means S in T ,
and this is intended to be in accord with Def. 1 and 2. By the basic principles
of epistemic logic we can reformulate EA as follows:
(EA′) For any agent A, A’s use of P of Li in situation T for purposes
of effective communication → BA,T (P means S) & JA,T BA,T (P
means S) & (P means S).
It might be argued that language users should not be required to explicitly
verify or check that P means S; that JA,T BA,T (P means S) need only be
interpreted as it being the case that A could verify that P means S. Perhaps
5 Compare Creswell [11]. Also, Jackson [12] has very recently defended this position in
the context of possible worlds semantics.
6 ‘Effective communication’ is here used in the sense of successful transmission of
information.
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it need only be the case that it is, in principle, physically possible for the
language user to do so. In responding this way, ersatzers might be thus
tempted to suggest that the meaning claims are implicit epistemic or doxastic
states, and also that our justications for believing that some meaning is the
meaning of a given sentences need only be such that they could be produced.
So one might object that EA′ is an excessively strong epistemic principle
to impose on language users in that, given this assumption, it appears that
meaningful use of any sentence requires that the language user have explicit
knowledge of the meaning of a sentence and that she be able in the explicit
cognitive possession of the justication for the associated meaning claim, as
opposed to some weaker cognitive stance toward that meaning claim such as
mere belief, or partially justied belief. These worries can be accommodated
as follows:
(EA′′) For any agent A, A’s use of P of Li in situation T for pur-
poses of effective communication→ iBA,T (P means S) & ♦JA,T BA,T
(P means S) & (P means S).
Here iBA,T P indicates A’s implicitly believing that P in T , and ♦JA,T BA,T
(P means S) indicates the physical possibility of A’s being justied in be-
lieving that (P means S). So all that EA′′ requires of A for A to successfully
communicate is that A implicitly believes that P means S and that A could
justify that P means S.
Having offered this interpretation of the epistemic assumption, we can now
offer a more formal presentation of the doxastic assumption as follows:
(DA) iBA,T (P means S) & ♦JA,T BA,T (P means S) → CA,T S.
Here CA,T P means that P is conceivable for A in T . DA simply asserts
that A’s being in the positive but implicit doxastic state of believing truly
that P means S also implies that A be able to possess the minimal, neutral,
sub-doxastic state of comprehension or conception of the meaning of P . It
is hard to see how this could be denied. If P is to be successfully used by A
in communication, then the members of S must be thinkable for A.7 Recall
7 Here we are defining the requisite concept of conceivability as the type of cognitive
access to members of S which requires that the members of S are consistent and which is
minimally required for belief. We note that the relevant concept is closely related to David
Chalmers concept of ideal positive conceivability [24], although with a verificationist twist.
More importantly, while it is surely possible to conceive of set’s being inconsistent or to
conceive that some of its members are inconsistent (and it is in fact easy to construct arbitrary
examples of such sets, e.g., the set of all round squares), it is not possible to conceive an
inconsistency. The former possibility is a real possibility — it is just conceiving of the fact
that a given set is inconsistent — whereas the latter kind of case is simply not possible. For
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that S =df. {Sl, Sm, Sn, . . . , Sk}, and it seems reasonable to assume that the
conceivability of S is just the conceivability of individual the elements of S.8
Given DA it is then plausible to believe that the additional derived princi-
ple, the (strong) conceivability assumption, is also true:
(SCA) CA,T S → KA,T (⊕S).
Here ‘⊕S’ indicates that the elements of S are individually consistent. SCA
simply asserts that a meaning is conceivable for A in T only if A knows that
each element of S is consistent. We can then expand the consequent of SCA
as follows:
(SCA) CA,T S → BA,T (⊕S) & JA,T BA,T (⊕S) & ⊕S.
As with EA, one might be tempted to ague that SCA is too strong and sug-
gest that A need not explicitly believe that the members of S are individually
consistent, and that A need only be (physically) able to justify this in princi-
ple.
We can then formulate the weak conceivability assumption as follows:
example one cannot conceive of a round square although one can conceive of facts about or
properties of round squares, e.g., that a round square is impossible. Moreover, one can even
conceive of the fact that the set of round squares is inconsistent because this is required by
the fact that we know and thus believe that such a set is inconsistent. What is not conceivable
is a round square since all such inconsistent states of affairs are inconceivable. The relevant
point here is that the ersatzer who accepts possible world semantics is committed to the
view that we must be able to conceive the members of the sets that constitute the meanings
of sentences, each of which is a possible world reductively identified with a maximal and
complete set of sentences. See f.n. 8 for more on this. This is to be carefully distinguished
from the possibility of conceiving that an S-set is in fact inconsistent which is the basis of
knowing that such an S-set is inconceivable. The relevant objects of conceivability for the
purposes of our arguments are the members of the S-sets (and not some descriptive condition
the members meet) and the members of S-sets cannot be conceived unless they are consistent.
8 One might be tempted here to argue that the grasping of such a set does not require
grasping its individual members and only requires grasping some (descriptive) condition that
its members meet. But this intensionalist maneuver is not open to the ersatzer. If the de-
scriptive condition in question is not the set of possible world descriptions constituting the
meaning of the sentence, then to adopt this position would be to cede ersatzism. The mean-
ing of the sentence being grasped would then just be the (presumably intensional) descriptive
condition and not the set of sentences it describes, but this is not what ersatzism takes mean-
ing to be.
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(WCA) CA,T S → iBA,T (⊕S) & ♦JA,T BA,T (⊕S) & ⊕S.
This principle should seem rather obviously true when we recognize that
conceivability is a success term related to the primitive concept of coher-
ent thought simpliciter; having positive doxastic attitudes, such as belief,
towards sentences or towards the propositions they express requires that the
contents of such beliefs meet some minimal (internal) coherence require-
ments. Of course, it follows from WCA that ⊕S, and so we nd that, at least
in terms of the meanings of declarative sentences, inconsistency is the mark
of inconceivability and, by EA′′ and DA, conceivability is a requirement for
successful use of such expressions. The conceivability of these candidate
possibilities, however, is not independent of our ability to verify that they
are or are not consistent, as that ability seems to, at least in part, constitute
the conceivability of those possibilities.9
While there may be something like meanings of expressions that are in-
conceivable but consistent, because they are too complex for us to verify
as consistent, it cannot be the case that the meaning of an expression is
inconsistent and conceivable. To allow inconsistencies to be conceivable
seems blatantly incoherent and we must be able to distinguish the conceiv-
able from the inconceivable if we are to meaningfully use language. So, to
put it both strongly and clearly, successful conception requires the possibility
of consistency determination. Barring then our positing ‘magical’ methods
of consistency verication on the basis of some faculty like imagination, in-
tuition, etc., it seems that it must be physically possible for A to determine
the consistency of the elements of the members of every S for each P by
some feasible, physically possible, method if she is to successfully use those
sentences in communication. Otherwise, for all A knows, P might be mere
gibberish and its use may convey no information at all.
9 We want to be clear that the keystone of our argument is the contention that conceiv-
ability requires verification of consistency and we think that there are very good reasons
to endorse this principle. Most importantly, unless one is willing to admit that inconsis-
tent/impossible objects are conceivable, then it follows that if x is conceivable, then x is
consistent. In effect, we regard conceiving as a mental act that requires some vetting of the
conceivable from the inconceivable, since otherwise conceivability is of no use to those who
defend possible world semantics or any other semantic theory for that matter. Moreover, as
we argue in the subsequent paragraph, such vetting is most plausibly explained in terms of
consistency verification, as opposed to other sources. For without some such test there is a
burden to show by other means that it is not possible to conceive inconsistencies. We do not
believe that this is possible, and we refer those respondents who believe that we can conceive
inconsistencies to our discussion in f.n. 7 and to Chalmers [24]. In any case, the view that
inconsistencies are conceivable is at best controversial and we believe it can thus be set to the
side in the absence of any good reason to accept such a radical view of conceivability.
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So it follows from EA′′, DA, and WCA that A cannot meaningfully use
P to communicate if the individual members of S are inconsistent, and it
seems plausible to believe that A must at least be able to verify, if not know,
this about the members of S if she is to successfully communicate informa-
tion using P .10 Again, for each P , A must be able to check, or verify, the
consistency of each member of the S-set of P if A is to be able to use P suc-
cessfully in communication where that is understood to involve transmitting
information contained in the S-set.
One might be tempted to respond that the ersatzer is not exactly committed
to EA′′ and its consequences and this kind of response might take one of two
predictable forms. First, one might reject EA′′ and hold that meanings are
not in the head and so the cognitive accessibility requirement that EA′′
imposes on speakers is just false. Alternatively, one might simply argue that
ersatzists should reject EA′′ altogether in a more basic manner on the basis
of deationary concerns, and simply adopt something like a pseudo-Quinean
eliminativism about meanings. In doing so, the ersatzer might just reject
cognitive accessibility requirements like EA′′ lock stock and barrel. These
responses to EA are unconvincing for various reasons, and, as we shall see in
section 5.2, they do not appear to be viable ways for the ersatzer to avoid the
main objections to ersatzist semantics that we can now turn our attention to.
But rst, to sum up, we have seen that in the context of the communicative
function of language the conjunction {EA′′ & Def. 1 & Def. 2} entails at
least that iBA,T (⊕S) & ♦JA,T BA,T (⊕S) & ⊕S.
4. The Finitude Thesis
The second condition necessary to derive the objection to ersatzist semantics
raised here is the finitude thesis. The nitude thesis is a general and well-
veried empirical/mathematical claim concerning our nitude and the result-
ing limitations on our cognitive abilities that follow from our nitude, and,
more specically, in this application, the nitude thesis has radical implica-
tions concerning our inability (1) to verify the logical consistency of large
sets of particular sentences in computationally feasible times, and (2) to do
so for large numbers of sets of sets of sentences.
Although it is somewhat difcult to formalize the nitude thesis itself in a
general manner, the basic concept is that the computational powers of actual
epistemic agents are nite and radically constrained by available computa-
tional resources. In other words, we are not omniscient, we do we have
innite available time in which to execute computations, and we do not have
10 Otherwise, P would not be a signal in the sense that signals carry coherent information.
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unlimited computational resources at our disposal to manage information.
In essence, what we would like the nitude thesis to express is the epistemic
correlate of the ‘ought implies can’ principle of ethics. So, informally, we
might regard this assumption as being constituted by the claim that:
(FT) Epistemic requirements for actual epistemic agents must be
such that they are in principle possible for agents to satisfy.
Interestingly, it turns out that the requirement that we be able to determine
the consistency of the members of any given S that follows from Def. 1,
Def. 2, and EA′′ far exceeds the computational abilities of any human, thus
violating FT, and, in point of fact, far exceeds the computational resources
available in the universe for sets of sentences that are of surprisingly small
size. In a related manner the requirement that we be able to check the consis-
tency of large numbers of S-sets that would reect the linguistic competence
of normal language users far exceeds available computational resources. So
we will nd that FT entails ¬CA,T S for most S, because we cannot verify
that the members of most S are consistent; in other words it will be demon-
strated that ¬♦JA,T BA,T (⊕S) is true. So, if it is not physically possible for
any actual epistemic agent to satisfy the requirements that ersatzist possible
world semantics imposes on epistemic agents when that view is conjoined
with EA′′, then that view of semantics cannot be correct if we are successful
in communicating.
5. Feasible Epistemological Tasks and Semantics
Christopher Cherniak [13, 14] has emphasized the point that, even assum-
ing ultra-fast but physically possible instruction execution times, consistency
checking problems using truth tables for sets of sentences with as few as 138
independent atomic propositions cannot be effectively solved in times that
fall within reasonable estimations of the duration of the universe from its
genesis up until now, a time period of approximately 2 x 1010 years.11 As
Cherniak notes,
Given the difculties in individuating beliefs, it is not easy to esti-
mate the number of logically independent atomic propositions in a
typical human belief system, but 138 seems much too low  too
small-minded. Yet suppose that each line of the truth table for the
11 See Thagard [15], chapter 2, for detailed consideration of the difficulties involved in
computing coherence/consistency.
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conjunction of all these beliefs can be checked in the time that it
takes a light ray to traverse the diameter of a proton, an appropriate
cycle time for an ideal computer. At this maximum speed, a con-
sistency test of this very modest belief system would require more
time than the estimated twenty billion years from the dawn of the
universe to the present (755756) [13].
If this is true, then possible world semantics and ersatzism cannot be a re-
motely realistic model-theoretic account of the semantics of ordinary lan-
guages and even of most articial languages as no nite agent could ever
then, as a matter of physical necessity, meaningfully use virtually any lin-
guistic expression of any realistic language in our world, for no such agent
could ever, using truth tables, verify the consistency of any model, of any
world, the description of which involves even very few independent atomic
propositions. This implication, drawn out from the conjunction of possible
world semantics and ersatzism, seems to blatantly contradict the facts con-
cerning our ability to meaningfully employ language in spite of the truth of
FT, and so by reductio either linguistic ersatzism, possible world semantics,
or both must be rejected, for surely the maximal and consistent state descrip-
tions of the sorts that the ersatzer proposes to identify possible worlds with
will contain at least 138 independent atomic propositions. In practice, how-
ever, S-sets will be massively larger, and, hence, utterly beyond our cognitive
grasp.
Of course, one might immediately object by pointing out that the truth-
table method is not the only method available to us for consistency checking.
To be sure, if the base logic of Li includes the predicate calculus, then we can
be sure from Church’s [16] and Turing’s [17] famous results that there exists
no general proof procedure that could accomplish consistency verication in
our language in any case; there is no such decision procedure. Other meth-
ods, e.g. natural deduction, based on the concept of theoremhood which are
not algorithmic, and, hence, not undermined by the Church-Turing thesis,
might appear to allow epistemic agents to verify the consistency of particular
possible world candidates that are the members of given S-sets. For incon-
sistent formulas such procedures will never terminate, but there are methods
by which we can verify that a given formula is consistent if it is consistent.
However, such procedures are typically very inefcient. Moreover, in such
cases we cannot reliably distinguish non-terminating proofs from long but
terminating proofs.
In any case, we might ask what would be required of epistemic agents if
they were to employ such procedures to verify the consistency of the ersatzer
worlds that are the meanings of the sentences they competently use. For any
meaningful sentence P that we consider, its S-set will be constituted by a set
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of sets of sentences each of which is composed of a maximal conjunction
of n negated or un-negated atomic sentences of Li, thus there will 2n such
conjunctions that A must believe and each of which A must be able to prove
to be consistent by some proof method other than the truth table method.
With only a little bit of imagination one ought to be able to see that, for any
ordinary language and even most articial languages, n will be extremely
large, and so A will be required to be able to construct a vast number of such
consistency proofs. For a language with only 50 atomic propositions, know-
ing the meaning of a given P would require A’s being able to constructing
perhaps as many as 1015 such proofs, supposing that we could distinguish
non-terminating proofs from long but terminating proofs (so that we could
move on to the next proof).
This result is so absurd that little additional commentary seems required to
conclude that such proof methods will not sufce to meet the requirements
for A to be justied in believing the members of S, but consider the possibil-
ity that A could complete 1,000,000 such proofs each day (including reliably
rejecting non-terminating proofs). If A could meet this exceptionally high
standard, then it would require approximately 3 x 105 years to accomplish
the task of verifying the consistency of the S-set of one simple sentence of
this semantically impoverished language! Considering that the average lin-
guistic competence of speakers of ordinary languages exceeds the correct
use of one sentence by many, many, orders of magnitude and that most lan-
guages, natural and articial, are far less impoverished, it would appear that
it is not even remotely possible that nite agents can meet the requirements
possible world semantics of the ersatzer sort impose on us when conjoined
with EA′′. So, barring the availability of other considerably more powerful
and less time consuming consistency checking methods, FT entails that we
cannot be justied in believing that the members of S-sets for virtually any P
are consistent as the conjunction {EA′′ & Def. 1 & Def. 2} requires, because
actual A’s cannot meet the basic requirement WCA.
5.1. Rejecting Maximality
In accord with suggestions made by Stalnaker [18], Hintikka [19] and Bar-
wise and Perry [20] one might immediately respond that there is no reason
that the ersatzer should not be able to appeal to incomplete or small worlds
rather than maximal, or complete, worlds. This would reduce the complexity
of the members of the S-sets associated with each P of Li. The suggestion
is that we need not treat world descriptions as maximal, or complete, and
one might intuitively suppose that this sort of strategy would be desirable in
that it would save the ersatzer from the conclusions about the incompatibil-
ity of possible world semantics and linguistic ersatzism demonstrated above.
If the ways things could have been need not be complete descriptions, then
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perhaps the descriptions of worlds which meanings are to be identied with
could be simplied to the degree that they would be epistemically feasible
for us to grasp, and hence ersatzer semantics would be able to satisfy EA′′
and FT. But, the conclusion concerning how small worlds would have to
be in order to be computationally tractable in the manner described above
would rob most languages of their expressive power by limiting many world
descriptions to far less atomic components than the 50 or 138 distinct atomic
propositions noted in the examples above. There is no doubt that ordinary
languages and most articial languages far exceed such expressive power.
So, the suggestion that the fact that some world descriptions are incomplete,
plausible as it may seem, will not help the ersatzer to deal with the problems
raised here concerning computational feasibility. Moreover, it would not
appreciably reduce the number of S-sets needed for a complete semantics
for a given language Li, and so would still require of A that she be capable
of checking the consistency of the members of vast numbers of S-sets; far
more than any agent could even in principle possibly ever produce. So, if
the ersatzer cannot legitimately reject EA′′, then, by reductio, either Def. 1
or Def. 2 or both must be rejected.
5.2. Why the Ersatzer Cannot Just Reject EA′′
This problem should be taken quite seriously by the ersatzer, and its gravity
is accentuated in virtue of the fact that, despite appearances to the contrary,
EA′′ is an extremely plausible, albeit strong, epistemic constraint of theories
of meaning. However, as we saw in section 4, the ersatzer might argue that
his position has been saddled with a view that he rejects. However, this is
not really the case. More importantly, there are good reasons to believe that
EA′′ is indispensable for those who would accept Def. 1 and Def. 2. If this
is so, then it is not the case that the ersatzer can avoid the problem by simply
rejecting EA′′. But why might one even suspect that this is the case?
Recall that there are two more or less obvious ways in which an ersatzer
might try to avoid the computational problems that afict ersatzer worlds
noted above. First, the ersatzer might reject EA′′ and hold that meanings are
not in the head and that the minimal cognitive accessibility requirement
that EA′′ imposes on speakers is just false. This is just the sort of externalist
tactic defended by Putnam and others. Alternatively, the ersatzer might sim-
ply reject EA′′ altogether on the basis of deationary concerns, and simply
adopt something like a pseudo-Quinean eliminativism about meanings. In
doing so, the ersatzer might just reject cognitive accessibility requirements
like EA′′ lock stock and barrel by rejecting the view that there are meanings
at all.
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First, in response to the Putnam-inspired externalist suggestion, it should
be obvious that the ersatzer cannot really appeal to this tactic without ced-
ing ersatzism itself. One of the chief motives behind the introduction of
ersatzism was to avoid accepting externalistic realism about possible worlds
like the view defended by David Lewis [21]. For the ersatzer’s to respond
against EA′′ in this manner would simply be a case of giving up Def. 2. So,
rejecting EA′′ by claiming that meanings are not in the head but that mean-
ings exist does not work. The sentences that constitute the meanings must
be somewhere, and they must be such that they are cognitively accessible to
language users (even if only implicitly so). The second, Quinenan, response,
that there are no meanings at all, similarly cannot be coherently adopted by
the ersatzer as that also would also require directly ceding Def. 2. If there
are no meanings, then meanings certainly cannot be maximal and consistent
sets of sentences.
Note that the ersatzer’s commitment to EA′′ is not a matter of meaning
internalism alone, although it does seem that most ersatzers are committed
to some form of that view. Rather, the ersatzer is committed to a form of
realism, albeit an unusual one. They appear to be linguistic realists in some
manner or other, but cannot by their own lights plausibly be Platonists or
naturalistic externalists. So if ersatzers are not semantic internalists, then it
is hard to see how their view does not just turn out to be a form of elimina-
tivism, and this does not make sense given Def. 2. So, the ersatzer does seem
to be committed to EA′′, and there does not seem any obvious way around
this that preserves the ersatzer’s deationary motives while retaining Def. 2.
Even if these metaphysical worries that derive from the ersatzer’s deation-
ary motives could be adequately resolved, it seems that rejecting EA′′ while
retaining Def. 2 entails that Def. 1 is irrelevant to natural language semantics
because of the FT, and so the conjunction of Def. 1 and Def. 2 cannot be a
part of a realistic theory of communication. Following Davidson [22], this
appears to a serious criticism of such theories, as if it is true, then ersatzer
possible world semantics is irrelevant to real cases of communication.
5.3. Grasping Some Worlds and Linguistic Competence
Another possible manner in which linguistic ersatzers might plausibly try
to avoid the results derived above is by claiming that linguistic competence
requires only that one grasp some of the possible worlds that are elements
of the meaning of a given declarative sentence as per the relevant denitions
noted above. This would obviously reduce the number of consistency veri-
cations that a competent speaker would need to perform. However, it should
be clear that this is essentially to concede the spirit of Def. 1. This is the case
because then there is nothing that corresponds to the meaning of a sentence.
There will be many meanings for any declarative sentence, many of which 
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presumably  would be adequate for understanding. Each of these would
be constituted by a sub-set of the possible worlds at which the sentence is
true. Nevertheless, there is some intuitive plausibility to this suggestion. If
one needs only to grasp some of the possible worlds at which a sentence is
true in order to communicate adequately using a given sentence, then the
epistemic task required for linguistic competence is of course reduced. The
problem, however, with this suggestion is that it is quite clearly intolera-
bly vague. Absent some principled suggestion concerning which and how
many worlds must be grasped in order to use a sentence competently this
suggestion cannot even be seriously evaluated. Certainly, one must suspect
that linguistic competence would require grasping at least a large number of
possible worlds in order to know when uses of a given sentence are appropri-
ate and that it must involve grasping some reasonable number of canonical
worlds corresponding to typical usages. However if this is true, then even if
the vagueness of this line of response could be eliminated it is not clear that
it would solve the ersatzer’s problem because as long as competence requires
grasping even reasonably large numbers of possible worlds the view will be
unrealistic due to the sorts of computational restrictions discussed above.
6. Conclusion
Given these modest results, one might be tempted to accept that possible
world semantics ought to be given up so that linguistic ersatzism could be
retained, but then it is hard to see what purpose the ersatzist’s doctrine is to
serve, for the main aim of appealing to possible worlds in the rst place was
to provide a philosophical analog for the models of formal model-theoretic
semantics in the context of various languages, natural and otherwise. So,
it would seem that the ersatzer’s view seems doomed to failure as a realis-
tic theory of semantics due to our nitude. Perhaps ersatzer’s might claim
that their view is not meant to be a cognitively realistic theory of seman-
tics, but then one must wonder what it is useful for.12 In any case, it seems
that neither that doctrine nor possible world semantics may, in point of fact,
be worth salvaging as anything but an overly complex abstraction. As the
12 Ersatzer’s might do well to look at Fox and Lappin [23] as a possible way to avoid some
of the problems of computational tractability they appear to face. We are not hopeful that
this will eliminate the main problems noted here, but that is a discussion requiring another
paper. Also, it would be interesting to examine the issue of whether the worries raised about
computational complexity here apply or do not apply to model-theoretic semantics in general.
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nitude thesis enjoys considerable support from both empirical and math-
ematical sources and EA′′ is implicitly assumed in ersatzer semantics this
result appears to be a resilient one.
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